power level in the optical fibre was measured to be 16 pW. Fig. 3 demonstrates the isolation effects of the assembly experimented at a frequency of 30 MHz. Here, the linearity of the system using the assemblies is compared with the system using a cascade connection of three conventional isolators (3 x 30 dB). It is found that the lincarity of the system using the assemblies is 20 dB and 40 dB wider than the one using the isolators at 0.001 dB and 0.01 dB deviation.
Scattering codes to implement short 3-secure fingerprinting for copyright protection F. Sebit and J. Domingo-Ferrer Collusion attacks arc a major issue in fingerprinting sclieincs Tor copyright proteclion. A new class of codes, called scattering codes, is prcscntcd which can be iised to control colludcrs' strategy in collusions of size up to 3. Scatlcring codes can bc conibincd with dual Hamming codcs to obtain 3-secure fingerprinting codcs much shorlcr than those resulting from Botich-Shaw's general construclion.
Successive failure of copy prevention systcins has caused copy detection systems to become the most promising option for multimedia copyright protection. In copy detection, the merchant embeds an imperceptible mark into the content before selling it. There arc two kinds of mark: watermarks and fingerprints. A watermark is a message that allows ownership of the marked content to be proven, whereas a fingerprint allows buyer idcntification.
Collusion atlaclts arc a problem fingerprinting, because each copy being sold is different. I n a collusion attack, a set of dishonest buyers compare their copies in order to locate differences bctwecn them and try to fabricate a new content whosc mark is either no longer recoverable or does not allow identification of any of the colluders.
In [I] , the concept of fingcrprinting secure against buyer collusions is introduced. A general construction is given to obtain fingerprinting codes secure against collusions of up to c buyers (c-secure codes). For N possiblc buyers and given c > 0, L = 2clog(2N/r) and d= 8c210g(XcL/c) a code with N codewords o r length I,, = 2Ldc = 32c4 log(2Nlc) log(XcL/c)
, is constiucted which allows one of thc colluders to be identified with probability I -c.
In [2] it is shown that, for c = 2, collusion security can be obtained using thc error-corrccting capacity of dual Hamming codcs. In this way, 2-secure fingerprinting codes arc obtained which arc much shorter than 2-secure codes obtained via the general construction [I] .
In [3] it is shown that, for c = 3 , dual Hamming codes also offer collusion security, as long as the colluders' strategy can be controlled.
This Letter describes how to control that strategy. 
Let us assume that thrcc dishonest buyers c', c2, cs compare their copies of the sainc multimedia content. According to the marking assumption [I], they can only modify the embedded marks in those detectable positions where not all three marks taltc the same bit value. In those positions, the colluders can set the corresponding bit to 0, 1 or 'unreadable'. In this way, we conclude that, if tlircc differcnt buyers arc assigned codewords a', a' and ci3 of a binary code, tlie result of their collusion will be a codeword a""" where 110 bit has been modified in the positions in inv(a', a', a'). Conversely, colluders will be able to identify positions in minor (a'; a2, u') as the bit positions corresponding to content fragments which are identical between the copics of c2 and c3 and different from the copy of c'. In a similar way, 1ninor(u2; a', a') and minor(cr3; a ' , a') can be identified as well.
Definition 3: A p-majority collusion strategy is one in which colluders choose with probability p the majority bit value in positions niitzor(a'; u ', ak) (Le. the bit values in ai or if), In [ 3 ] it i s shown that dual Hamming codes offer security against collusions of up to three colludcrs, as long as a p-majority collusion strategy is used with a value p close to 1. The problem is that the parameter p defining the collusion strategy is chosen by thc colluders, which implies they can take p = 0 to make sure they are not identified! To circumvent that shortcoming, we define below a new kind of codes callcd scattering codes. 
The code SC(d, t) is generated by replicating d times every bit in the codewords of SC( 1, t).
Definc a hlock to be a group ofri replicated bits.
3. By convention, the first t codewords ofSC(d, t) are defined to encodc a '1' and the last t codewords are defined to encodc a '0'. Thc first block of the code is called 'Zone-A', the next t blocks arc called 'Zone-B' and the last t blocks are called 'Zone-C'.
Using a scattering code, a ' 1 ' is encoded by randomly choosing one of the first t codewords and a '0' is encoded by randomly choosing one of the last t codewords. A scattering code is decoded by using thc first applicablc rule among the following ordered list: Leminzu I Let bC0" bc a codeword generated by using a p-majority strategy between threc codewords O', b2, b' E S C (~, t) encoding tlic same hit valuc v. Then, /I""" decodes as v with probability 1. Leinmu 2 Let h"" he a codeword generated using ap-majority stratcgy between thrcc codewords bl, h2, h' E SC(c1, t), with two of them (h' and b2) encoding a value v and the other (b') a value V. Then, the probability that bC"" decodes as +p" 'E h(l2; (1. p ) = ry] Tablc I shows, for several codes K(d, t) , the least probability p ( v ) of decoding as the majority bit in a collusioii of thrcc codewords (two encoding v and onc V). For N=2" buyers, each buyer c' is assigned a different codeword ui of a dual Hamming code. Rather than directly embedding a' in the content to be sold, the merchant generates a codeword A' by composing a scattcring code SC (d, t ) with N'. Such a composition is performed by replacing each bit of ci' with a codeword in SC(d, t) that encodes thc valuc of the bit of n'. In this way, the codeword A' will havc bitlength
The merchant then permutes thc hits in A' using a pseudorandom permutation seeded by a secrct key ltnown only to thc mcrcliant. Finally, the merchant embcds the permuted version of A' in the content being sold.
What is achieved with the above composition is that, regardless ofthe p-majority strategy used by colludcrs to generate codewords A""", the p(v)-majority strategy rcsulting from decoding A'"'" as a""" has a valuc p(v) that can be controlled by the merchant by choosing appropriate values for parameters d and t.
Tablc 2 shows that, for fixed security level c, the codes generated with O L I~ construction arc much shorter than Boncli-Shaw's as long as tlic number of buyers stays moderatc. 
